What are the Armed Forces for, and how is the SDSR supposed to help them achieve this end?

My thanks to the Assistant Head, Strategic Defence and Security Review Secretariat, for taking the time to shed some light on the matter:

Date 27th Oct 2011

Dear Mr [Beeftrix],

Thank you for your email dated 10th October 2010 to the Secretary of State for Defence on the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). Your letter has been passed on to me for a reply. I am very sorry we have taken so horribly long to reply. We try to reply to all the letters we receive, but I am afraid that we have had so many on the SDSR and on Defence Reform that this has taken much longer than we would like.

The Government’s National Security Strategy (NSS) defines Britain’s place in the world, and it identifies two core objectives as: ensuring a secure and Resilient United Kingdom; and shaping a stable world. It is in the national interest to continue to be actively engaged in world affairs. This requires the UK to stand up for the values our country believes in – the rule of law, democracy, free speech, tolerance and human rights. To be able to do this we must maintain strategic influence and have the ability to project power as well as using our unique network of alliances and relationships – with the United States of America and as a member of NATO and the European UNion as well as a permanent member of the Security Council. The NSS for the first priorities the risks the country faces and the tasks we must undertake to tackle them. With the SDSR it presents for the first time a whole of Government approach to the full range of the UK’s security challenges that ensures the UK will maintain the capability to act well beyond our shores and work with our allies to have a strategic presence wherever we need it.

The Government could not ignore the present financial situation or the MOD’s budget deficit. A strong economy is a national security requirement and an affordable Defence programme is the only responsible way to support the Armed Forces in the long term. Deficit reduction is therefore an overriding strategic priority for the Government and Defence has its part to play in bringing the budget back into balance over the next few years. That said, the Government quite deliberately cut the Defence budget less than spending as a whole because it is fundamental to the UK’s national security. Despite these cuts we expect the UK to remain the fourth largest military budget in the world and to meet NATO’s target of spending 2% of gross domestic product on Defence. The resources allocated for the next four years will enable us to pursue today’s operations and prepare for those of tomorrow. As events in Libya show, the agile and flexible forces the SDSR concluded the UK needs make a profound difference on the world stage.

The Government has two main priorities in the SDSR: to protect the UK mission in Afghanistan and ensure that we emerge with a coherent Defence capability in 2020. It had to make tough decisions to scale back the overall size of the Armed Forces and reduce some capabilities less critical to today’s requirements. Ministers have made clear that had the Government has a clean sheet of paper, without the fiscal deficit, unrestrained by existing contractual obligations and in a different operational circumstances, the result would undoubtedly have been different.

Nevertheless, although difficult, the decisions it made are coherent and consistent, and will provide the UK with the capabilities that we requires for the future that will allow us to project power and influence in a rapidly changing world. The Government is, therefore, pressing ahead with procuring those key capabilities. These include the two new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers, seven Astute class nuclear hunter-killer submarines, a fast jet fleet of Typhoon and Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) and modern strategic and tactical lift aircraft. The government is also investing in activities, such as conflict prevention and aid, that prevent the development of threats ‘upstream’, before they require a more demanding military response.

What this means is that by 2020:

• The Royal Navy will have new aircraft carriers with the JSF carrier-variant, a high readiness amphibious capability, a new fleet of T45 destroyers and Astute class submarines – and ready at that point to accept the new Global Combat Ship;
• The Army, based on Multi-Role Brigades, will be powerful, flexible, fully equipped for the land environment and be able to operate across the spectrum of conflict; and
• The RAF will be built around hi-tech multi-role combat aircraft Typhoon and the JSF, surveillance and intelligence platforms such as Airseeker, and a new fleet of strategic and tactical transport aircraft including A400M and Voyager.

Although the future Armed Forces will be smaller than now, the UK will remain one of the very few countries that can deploy and sustain a brigade sized force with its air and maritime enablers, capable of intervention and stabilisation operations almost anywhere in the world.

The SDSR also concluded that we will make substantial reductions in our civilian workforce. MOD civil servants play a critical role in Defence. They support Ministers in determining policy and strategy; managing the resources allocated by Parliament; and maintaining key international relationships. They also perform a range of vital front line roles, from manning the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and providing fire safety, to scientific knowledge, contracts expertise, logistics support, intelligence capabilities and policy advice. However, as we move to a new force structure, restructure defence capabilties and rationaise the estate, we will need fewer civilian personnel. In the SDSR and since the Government is therefore planning reductions of some 25,000 civilian staff by 2015 and a further 7,000 by 2020, against a baseline of 85,000 before the SDSR. As of 1st July 2011 numbers against this baseline had already fallen to some 78,300.

The Government accepts there are some risks associated with transition to a new force structure and reacting to unexpected events. It is managing this by maintaining the UK’s strategic intelligence capability, ensuring we have adaptable capabilities, deepening partnerships with international allies, and preserving the ability to reconstitute military capability. Overall, the SDSR is a point of departure, not the end of the line. The Goverment has set a path to 2020 and beyond, with regular reviews every five years. Up to 2015 is a period of rebalancing the UK’s strategic direction. From 2015 to 2020 will be about re-growing capability and achieving the Governments overall vision.

I hope this is helpful

[Assistant Head, Strategic Defence and Security Review Secretariat]

It has been, my sincere thanks for taking the time to write such a detailed response.

As noted previously:

We face no existential threats, but others do, so there will always be a requirement for someone to arbitrate disputes from the end of a gun barrel (lets call this the UNSC for now). Given that we face no existential threats, and that we have a population that is (still) accepting of elective warfare, it is at least appropriate that Britain should consider itself for the role of gun-barrel arbiter.

However, an appropriate ambition is not the same the as a realisable one, but on the other hand we will remain a top-ten economy beyond 2050 and likely a top-five military spender in the same timeframe, so perhaps it is a realisable ambition too.

As for what Britain gets out of its determination to play world-cop; arguably not enough if we are purely looking at this through the lense of national (self) interest. However, there is nothing immoral in this ambition as we have an interest in promoting an international rules based system where laws and norms are adhered to. Responsibility to Protect, a ‘norm’ now quite accepted in International Relations is a case in point (read: Libya). Britain’s position on the Security Council is in part justified by the strategic bargain with friends and allies that we will work to achieve collective security in the widest sense. We can choose not to meet the requirements of that strategic bargain, but then we really ought consider giving up our SC seat, and live with the fact that our successor will be acting to further their interest rather than ours.

Libya was a success and thus gives legitimacy to R2P as a template for the future interventions, which is exactly what France and Britain want. All they have to offer the UNSC in the 21st century is their high-tech ability to project power as the worlds policemen. France and Britain in the 21st century lack the prestige, industry, geography, population, or wealth that might otherwise justify their seats, they need R2P, and they needed Libya to be a successful piece of legal precedent.

Will the British public support such ambitions as blithely stated above?

According to a recent survey commissioned for Chatham House on public attitudes to British Foreign Policy this is just fine:

Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?

1. The UK should remain a great power, with substantial armed forces and our own seat at the United Nations Security Council as one of the ‘big five’ permanent members: YouGov 49% GB 62%
2. The UK should accept that it is no longer a great power, cut its defence budget significantly, and in due course give up its seat on the United Nations Security Council: YouGov41% GB 22%
3. Don’t know: YouGov 10% GB 15%

There you have it, but this also illustrates the danger.

Anyone who wants to find out exactly how small the British Army can get, and the other services to a lesser extent, has only to keep on cheering as the Army is committed to one protracted and nasty COIN war after another………….. until the day when this statistic is reversed:

On that day the electorate will have stated it is no longer willing to see the country as a Great Power willing to project power for the greater ‘good’*. Then you will see the Defence budget decimated!

Meeting the NATO commitment will at that point become optional, reconfiguring the entire army to sustain power-projection will become antithetical to a cost-effective self-defence force, assets that allow HMF to dominate a theatre of war will be an irrelevance. The Army will rapidly become a light-duty peacekeeping force of 60,000 blue-helmets.

* enlightened self-interest in Hague parlance

Rather depends on how deluded you are, for there was very little choice available to Cameron.

As Aaron pointed out there is something surreal about the most common argument that Cameron chose badly:

“Given the third truth, David Cameron chose the least bad option, as it seems the only way this country can gain “influence” in Europe is if it gave up pursuing its own interests and devoted all our energies to pursuing those of France and Germany (which is what The Economist‘s Bagehot and Charlemange seem to be recommending).”

The common theme being derision at the notion that a veto was wielded, because nothing was actually gained that wouldn’t have happened anyway, only now we have isolated Britain from europe and will no longer have a place in the engine room alongside Merkozy.

This assumption is always expressed as exasperation at the influence we have thrown away, but is always done in couched terms and veiled allusions. A good example is found on Libdemvoice:

“For much of the noughties, the Germans were begging the Brits to become a part of a triumvirate, who would be the real movers and shakers in an ever expanding Union. But instead, the Germans are left to share the steering role just with France.”

What are the consequences of this fantasy they hold to; are they willing to turn to the British public and admit the price, the loss of sovereignty, involved in joining France and Germany at the helm of europe?

I ask them to be honest about the implications of these pious mutterings; are they willing to state plainly to the electorate the consequence of being in the first tier, i.e. being in the euro and a driving force in further federalism?

This plainly cannot happen when the electorate – by a large majority – wants a referendum on europe, and would vote to leave if given one.

What really happened?

While this new treaty had nothing to do with the City of London directly, there is a whole raft of stupid and dangerous legislation that threatens to be imposed by QMV in the near future, and done so under the guise of solving the economic crisis and making amends for having caused it. So I would direct all to section 2.2 of the following document:

http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/continentalshift.pdf

In order to fend off this imminent ‘attack’ on our free-wheeling Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism (irony alert), Cameron took the opportunity on Thursday night to ask for the following:

• Any transfer of power from a national regulator to an EU regulator on financial services would be subject to a veto.

• Banks should face a higher capital requirement.

• The European Banking Authority should remain in London. There were suggestions that it might be consolidated in the European Security and Markets Authority in Paris.

• The European Central Bank be rebuffed in its attempts to rule that euro-denominated transactions take place within the eurozone.

France and Germany said no, so we said you must go on about your rescue without us, there is £50b/year in tax revenue from the City and HMG will fight to keep collecting it!

Everything has a value as well as a price. Cameron used the threat to impress upon Merkozy the value we attribute to the City, and how it far exceeded the price they thought it worth. They still didn’t back down, but that is the way of such things sometimes, compromise not always being possible.

Was there really a threat?

Judge for yourself:

“Mr President, To overcome the current crisis, all necessary measures to stabilize the euro area as a whole will have to be taken. Those steps need to be taken now without further delay. We consider this as a matter of necessity, credibility and confidence in the future of Economic and Monetary Union. This conviction is the driving-force behind our proposal. * Financial regulation; * Labor markets; * Convergence and harmonization of corporate tax base and creation of a financial transaction tax;”

There are bullet points that explicitly mention the eurozone………….. and then there are bullet points that remain ambiguous, and as the Economist’s Bagehot has put it best:

“Successive British governments have believed that on balance membership of the EU is in their interests (or is worse than non-membership). But because we are different (and because we take a common law as opposed to Napoleonic view of regulation, favouring a world in which everything is allowed unless it is expressly prohibited), we seek at every turn to pin down every detail of new rules or schemes being proposed, in case some of it turns out to be harmful. What was on the table on Thursday night was not clear in all its details when it came to the implications for the single market, so it was genuinely a tricky document for Mr Cameron.”

But nothing was actually achieved!

Some people have pointed out that nothing has really changed because this financial regulation is still subject to codecision under QMV at 27, and if 26 of the 27 states have already decided, then it’s a done deal. That, however, would have been the case regardless of the outcome, as Sarkozy made clear no compromise was available on the subject of financial regulation. It is worth noting that unpalatable financial regulation that emerges from the new euro-group – lacking the legitimacy bestowed by the web of EU treaty law – will prove far easier for London to resist.

So what was the point?

The point was that Cameron had no choice, he couldn’t come back to parliament with nothing because his government would collapse if he failed to offer the referendum so many want, and he can’t the referendum either because it would fail, thus causing further chaos in the eurozone crisis. More than half his backbenchers refused to back the Gov’t the last time the EU came up, and this time Ministers were briefing against him, it would be a bloodbath.

Well, what will be the fall-out?

That is three-fold:

1. To follow Peter Oborne’s argument, the veto was used not because Cameron demanded repatriation of powers, but because Sarkozy would not spare the City of London from the tide of regulation that approaches. It was not the leaders of european nations that rejected these safeguards, they never got a look-in because Sarkozy rejected them outright. Remember, this summit solved nothing as there was no direct support for sovereigns, no debt mutualisation and regime for fiscal transfers, and thus the farce will stumble on for years to come.  So, when the next ‘permanent’ solution to the euro-crisis needs haggling the smaller countries will be watching France not Britain.
2. While some of the more high-strung Lib-Dem’s are squeaking shrilly at Clegg’s betrayal of their europhile dreams, what really happened was that Clegg was given a mechanism with which he can draw his party to a more pragmatic stance on the EU. There were no nasty eurosceptic demands for repatriation of powers; “all we asked for were protections for the City of London and they couldn’t even agree to that! We will continue to be pro-european, working to maintain the single market and advocate reform to encourage competitiveness, but we will do so in the British interest.” This stance will both help the Lib-Dem’s and highlight the irrelevance of the opposition.
3. A whole slew of protracted and nasty legal cases as Britain and France fight over whether EU institutions can be used to bind and enforce the evolution of the mechanism for fiscal oversight in the eurozone. The eurozone partners still want their eventual solution to be bound in EU treaty, it will resolve a great deal of legal awkwardness, and prevent the need to invent parallel institutions. France will continue to push for financial regulation of the City of London. I see a compromise in there somewhere, one that will both push London further away from the core and cement that core closer around France. Both parties will get what they want, and Germany will midwife the process willingly for it wants neither Britain out nor a French-tail wagging the eurogroup-dog..

So we really do have a two speed EU now?

Yes, we really do. The idea that, for all the bluster, we’ll rejoin the fold with tail ‘twixt legs just as we always have, is more than a little 20th century. In 1986 europe represented 35% of world GDP, today it is around 25%, and by 2036 europe will be little more than 15% of world GDP, europe is now a strategic backwater which no longer compels our attention. While there has been a two-speed europe ever since the Euro sprang into being, as long as we all pretended it was not so it remained impossible to articulate an alternative. Well, Friday ended the pretence.

That “no” may well result in an a-la-carte EU where countries outside the core choose the areas where they wish to integrate, without compromising the ambitions of the rest. A Sweden that is no longer obliged to become a eurozone member, or a Denmark that can leave Schengen? If Cameron plays his cards right it could well happen, for it is only when times are hard and radical policy needed that it becomes impossible for a multi-polity union to govern in a manner that is both representative and accountable. Well, times are hard right now, and some of those polities are shocked to discover that their governance appears to lack legitimacy.

Bottom line.

You can’t be a little bit pregnant, and after some prevarication we have decided we’re not. Hopefully others will follow.

.

Update – 2011.12.10 – My congratulations to the Guardian for providing by far the best behind-the-scenes coverage of the EU summit on Thursday night.

Update – 2011.12.10 – As Charles Crawford points out, there is more to influence with europe than mere treaties, there is also the matter of our 57 billion Euros (a year).

Update – 2011.12.12 – Turns out that just over 80% of those who expressed an opinion, one way or the other, approved of Cameron’s action.

In the space of just ten years the value of our trade with europe vis-a-vis the rest of the world has slipped dramatically, and it has done so because europe is now a low-growth zone.

You might well ask; “surely it was only three years ago that Brussels was claiming that 60% of our trade was done within the EU, so are you not making these figures up Mr Beeftrix?” Indeed they were, so perhaps the discrepancy is attributable to trade being defined in terms of goods only, and not including the service component.  Speculation on your authors part, nothing more, but have they never heard the UK described as a service economy?

The figures provided by the ONS are unequivocal; by 1999 the value of trade in both imports and exports of both goods and services represented no more than 55% of the total. However, it is not this absolute figure that is interesting, no, what matters is that by the year 2011 this figure had fallen to less than 50%, with extra-EU trade now forming the majority in a trend that shows no sign of abating.

The source of those percentages are derived from this graph:

The cause is obvious; the growth in trade to the RoW remains vigorous while growth in trade to EU markets tails off.

The balance of trade with the EU makes equally depressing reading with a minor surplus in service trade being sunk by a huge deficit in goods trade. Contrast this with the RoW where a large deficit in the goods trade is at least counterbalanced by a large surplus in service trade.

To conclude, if Britain is to maintain it’s standard of living, during a period of declining demographics in europe and rapid development outside europe, where should we direct our attentions to ensure healthy export markets in the coming decades? Seems pretty clear from here:

In another ten years that fraction of trade we conduct with the EU will have shrunk to 40%, and then to thirty-five in the decades following, will we still be telling ourselves the fiction that peace and prosperity in Britain is the gift of Brussels, and will the Lib-Dem’s be around to say; “we told you so”?

Update 2011.11.15 – Mayhap I spoke too soon!

Mr Clegg said there was a middle ground between greater integration, favoured by France and Germany, and total withdrawal from Europe, favoured by dozens of backbench Conservative MPs:

“What we want is a European Union which is exclusively oriented towards growth prosperity and jobs,”

As noted previously, Clegg’s goal is to transform the Lib-Dems from a protest group seeking to influence what it believes should be a consensual political system, into a politcal party jostling for power in an adversarial parliamentary democracy.

Good luck.

Mr Elop very obligingly replied.

My email sent this afternoon:

Dear Mr Elop,

Please understand that I am not writing to you to rant about the WP7 direction, I accept the fact that Nokia did not believe Meego would bring them the level of success deemed necessary, rather I am worried that Nokia’s WP7 marketing strategy will prevent me from acquiring a Nokia N9 on a typical carrier subsidised contract within the UK.

I have no doubt that I will be able to buy an N9 from etailers such as Play.com, etc, but the N900 which I have happily used since its UK launch was £450 sim-free when it arrived, whereas my T-mobile contract with an unlocked handset was £110 upfront followed by eighteen payments of £20, or £470 in total. I am very keen to own and use a Nokia N9 but question why, in the UK, I would willingly pay the RRP for a phone when I can get it along with eighteen months of calls, texts and internet for £20 more.

I understand that you would urge me to have a closer look at Nokia’s new, and no doubt innovative, WP7 handsets that will be arriving in the near future, but I remain uninterested in them just as I remain uninterested in iPhones or Android phones. I merely seek reassurance that Nokia’s UK product support for the N9 will not preclude UK carriers from offering this handset on contract?

If you can offer this reassurance then I will be a very happy person, and can promise to remain a happy Nokia customer for years to come.

Kind regards

JBT

The response just a few hours later:

Hello there,

I can’t comment on what specific operators may or may not do in each country – many of those decisions are happening right now for the latter part of the year. In all cases, the operators will make decisions about which products will be made available, with which rate plans, etc.  Each operator in each country only has so many “slots”, and they divide those up between ourselves and our competitors, and within Nokia they can mix between N9, Windows Phone, Symbian, etc.  Right now, many of the larger operators are showing a strong preference towards WP…

Regards,

Stephen

Here is a screenshot of the email:

It was a pretty straight question, and it appears to be a pretty straight answer, which if considered as such reads: The carriers will decide whether the N9 is available on contract, not us.

If it remains a carrier decision, and nothing in Nokia’s (lack of) specific-market support inhibits their choice, then this blogger will remain a happy chap.

Fingers crossed!

Update – Further clarification

Thank you very much for the swift reply, it is greatly appreciated.

Just to quickly clarify; do I understand correctly that the availability of N9 handsets on carrier-contracts in the UK will be determined by carrier interest in the N9, vis-a-vis other Nokia smartphone handsets, and not by Nokia themselves?

I am quite content that the N9 compete for the attention of carriers.

So what do we end up with?

It has been said in various circles that the RUSI doctrines are unworkable solutions based off bankrupt ideas, notably that Global Guardian is predicated on nation-building of a type that the British public has lost patience with, and Strategic Raiding relying on the fantasy of “Go first, go fast, go home”. This blog believes that the error leading to these conclusions are that they are seen as absolutes; the notion that the Royal Navy should reduce to a coast-guard or likewise that the Army should reduce to a glorified US Marine Corps, when in fact they are nothing more than preferences that add emphasis to one area of the force structure or another.

What follows is this authors inexpert suggestion of a land force structure for each:

2009 -

2x Armoured Brigades

3x Mechanised Brigades

2x Light Brigades

1x Air Assault Brigade

1x Marine Brigade

RUSI Balanced -

5x Multirole Brigades (1x Armd Regt, 1x Form Rec, 1x Armd Inf, 1x Mech Inf, 1x Light Inf )

1x Marine Brigade (3x Commando, 1X Light Inf)

1x Air Assault Bgde (3x Para, 1X Light Inf) presuming 16AAB is due for reform in 2015

This structure would see land forces similar to Contributory above, but keeping two brigades for intervention, with a more capable naval structure and a less C4/ISTAR dominated air force.

Global Guardian -

4x Mechanised Brigades (1x Armd Regt, 1x Form Rec, 1x Armd Inf, 2x Mech Inf)

4x Motorised Brigades (2x Mech Inf, 2x Light Inf)

1x Commando Brigade (2x Commando, 2X Para)

The goal to generate and sustain a 2Star command in the field formed around two brigades, and to keep available a battle-group force for limited interventions. This structure would use the 3:1 ratio based on nine month tours.

Strategic Raiding -

4x Multirole Brigades (1x Armd Regt, 1x Form Rec, 1x Armd Inf, 1x Mech Inf, 1x Light Inf )

1x Marine Brigade (3x Marine Cdo, 1x Light Inf)

1x Air Assault Bgde (3x Para Battalion, 1x Light Inf)

1x Army Commando Bgde (4x Light Inf)

The goal to generate and sustain a brigade in the field formed around a single Multirole Brigade, but to keep three light brigades ready for Limited/Punitive Interventions at a medium scale. This structure would use the 3:1 ratio based on nine month tours, but would not anticipate the light brigades being in constant rotation. The ninth armoured battalion would be a Form Rec unit composed of three sabre squadrons of light armour, to equip the commando brigades as required.

Contributory -

5x Multirole Brigades (1x Armd Regt, 1x Form Rec, 1x Armd Inf, 1x Mech Inf, 1x Light Inf )

1x Commando Brigade (2x Commando, 2X Para)

The goal to generate and sustain a brigade, along with theatre level C4 and ISTAR assets, in the field as the core of a larger multinational command, and to keep available a Commando force for limited interventions at battle-group level. This structure would use the 4:1 ratio based on six month tours.

FF2020 -

5x Multirole Brigades (1x Armd Regt, 1x Form Rec, 1x Armd Inf, 1x Mech Inf, 1x Light Inf )

1x Marine Brigade (3x Commando, 1X Light Inf)

1x Air Assault Bgde (3x Para, 1X Light Inf) presuming 16AAB is due for reform in 2015

The goal to generate and sustain a brigade in the field formed around a single Multirole Brigade, and to keep available a Commando force for limited interventions at battle-group level. This structure would use the 4:1 ratio based on six month tours. There exists the possibility, as evidenced by the survival of both 3Cdo and 16AAB, that the ambition may return to Limited/Punitive Interventions at the brigade level, but this would not be expected before 2020 as a result of Afghanistan (and Iraq).

So, were these units and formations just pulled out of a hat? Yes, but they are broadly compatible with the cost assumption of RUSI’s FDR7 paper linked above. It is worth noting, that just as Defence Select Committees have felt free to use the term FF2024 to indicate capabilities that will take longer to arrive, so have I:

Note1 – Bold in the “2009” column indicates RUSI figures

Note2 – Bold in the “RUSI Bal” column indicates RUSI figures

Note3 – Bold in the “FF2020” column indicates my assumptions post SDSR 2015

Note4 – Feel free to confirm or amend the non-bold “FF2020″ figures.

Total =SUM(Ground Forces+(Air Forces/10)+Naval Forces)

Just to reiterate; this exercise is only a method of reshuffling numbers based on the RUSI figures, but provided the RUSI figures are accurate then the exercise has value.

If the total figures at the bottom are any kind of useful indicator then this blog’s suggestion for a Strategic Raiding and Global Guardian force structure will cost only fractionally more than their Balanced Force scenario. This is not unaffordable given that the actual cut in Defence spending was limited to 7.5% rather than RUSI’s best guess of 12%-15%, and both are predicated on the real-terms increases from 2015 that have now been agreed with the Treasury. The Contributory doctrine is of course significantly cheaper, as it should be since it eschews sovereign and strategic power projection along with the Great Power ambitions that require it.

What do these cost projections tells us about the validity of the SDSR’s Future Force 2020? The SDSR is frequently derided as a cost-driven exercise, with few pretensions to strategy as a guiding light in the reform process, and there is some validity to the accusation. The FF2020 structure does bear the hallmark of the salami-slicing Defence Review that many feared, failing to lean decisively in one direction or another and costing more as a result. However, it is not a great deal more costly so what matters here is capability retained.

Perhaps the words of General Houghton to the Defence Select Committee go some way towards explaining the lack of an explicit land/maritime focus:

Q552 Chair: One further question. Will Future Force 2020 be a full spectrum capability future force?

Nick Harvey: I would not want to add to what I have already said. I believe it will have a wide spectrum of capability. The Vice Chief may want to say more.

General Houghton: If it is positive, made affordable and delivered, you can have a dance about full spectrum. I read what Sir Rupert Smith said, and spectrum is, in many respects, relative to one’s enemy, not to the universe. You have to constrain your boundaries.

It meets the National Security Council’s adaptive posture in its considerations of the time. So it still has the ability to project power in all three environments at a strategic distance, and the ability to commit to a sustained operation on the land in the messy environment as depicted in our “Future Character of Conflict”. In that respect, it would be full spectrum within sensible bounds; it must be bounded in the reality of national ambition.

The answer to that is that FF2020 does bear a remarkable resemblance to what this blog considers Strategic Raiding, and where it fails is in the reduced ambitions of the Limited/Punitive Intervention forces. All is not lost however as this is only a reduced ambition; both 3Cdo and 16AAB are retained and could, post Afghanistan, receive the supporting forces they need to deploy at brigade level. This perception is enhanced by the recommendations of the Reserves Review, reinforcing them as you would expect at a time when the Regular Forces are being reduced.

To finish with the words of Prof Lindley-French to the Defence Select committee:

“There is a very great danger that by default, if we hold our nerve, we could end up with quite a sound defence strategy. There will be two carriers, strategic mobility, Astutes-not enough, but in time you could build more over 20, 30 or 40 years-Type 45s and Type 26s. It is a concept whereby there is projectability, not globally but regionally-plus. We could actually have a defence strategy worth talking about, by muddling through and from the bottom up, which has nothing to do with the NSS or the SDSR. The issue is, can we hold our nerve over that longer investment period?”

So, does it make sense, and how would you see the doctrines being structured?

[note -should be the final version, spreadsheet available here]

Update – 2011.09.11 – Gabrielle has taken a crack at the Future Force 2020:

Can I commend this to everyone interested, there is a fantastic amount of detail here, particularly in the linked explanatory document. I merely went with the RUSI figures, but Gabby obviously understands them and can provide a coherent explanation for why a particular configuration is desirable, who will likely fill the role, and how they will be equipped. Agree or disagree, this forms the foundation of an informed debate and i think this information will be helpful, not least because this is written with the latest reductions and reserves changes in mind.

Thank you Gabby, this is exactly the kind of response I was hoping for.

The explanatory notes are available here.

Is this the promised land, where British democracy becomes accountable once more?

Possibly, but it rather hangs upon whether Germany doesn’t torpedo matters first.

It has been suggested by some that the price should; include Britain’s escape from the Social Chapter, the Common Fisheries Policy and the European Convention on Human Rights, but we cannot ignore the Tory’s coalition partners. The Lib-Dem’s are, not to paint with too broad a brush, largely in favour of the acquis communautaire principle whereby once a ‘competence’ has been granted to the EU it cannot come back. Clegg it would appear holding this point on principle:

“Anything now which suggests we are somehow trying to distance ourselves from that, I think in the long run could be economically self defeating.”

His problem is that merely by maintaining our current status, during a process of economic fusion within the eurozone we will, de-facto, be creating a two-speed europe. In itself this is a fine thing, for while this blog is sympathetic to the notion of being in the EU long enough to shape europe’s future towards a healthier course, the strong british free-market presence in the commission being a good example, perhaps we are reaching the apogee of what that purpose can achieve. We now how an EU with new members favourable to free market solutions, and we can no longer continue to play at the centre without ceasing to be a sovereign nation state. More to the point, it is not for Britain to frustrate the legitimate ambitions of our partners across the water, if economic union is both desired and required then we should not stand in its way.

However, the principle of a two-speed europe, while desirable, is not what this blogger is interested in; what matters is the price that is extracted by Britain for assisting this transition. George has some thoughts on this front already:

“It is not yet clear how far or how fast eurozone countries will want to go on fiscal integration, but as they decide, this Government will constantly be alert for opportunities to protect and advance our national interests. We must make sure we are not in any way excluded from key decisions on issues, such as the single market and financial service regulation, that should remain the exclusive preserve of all 27 EU states. We must get the EU focused on the positive agenda that matters to its citizens of creating jobs and prosperity, by becoming a far more competitive continent in which to do business.”

What price fits the notion of the national interest?

Which of those does not conflict with the goal of a free and open single market for goods and services?

From the Conservative manifesto we have the following:

1) The referendum lock
2) A United Kingdom sovereignty bill
3) A guaranteed say for MP’s if Ministers want the EU to extend its powers
4) Opt out from the charter of fundamental rights
5) Return of powers over criminal justice
6) Repatriation of control over social and employment legislation

The general verdict was that pledges one to three were easy crowd-pleaser’s, little political capital both at home and abroad would be required in implementing them, and by the same token they would have very little effect given that Lisbon was to be the last constitutional tinkering for at least a decade.

Where it gets tricky for Dave, so the received wisdom goes, is pledges four to six because they effectively require unanimous agreement from all EU nations that Lisbon be exhumed from its final resting place in order that Cameron can further dismember the remains.

The easiest direction to pursue are those elements that are compatible with the coalition agreement, as noted in the previous article:

6. Repatriation of control over social and employment legislation
   We agree that there should be no further transfer of sovereignty or powers over the course of the next Parliament. We will examine the balance of the EU’s existing competences and will, in particular, work to limit the application of the Working Time Directive in the United Kingdom.

5. Return of powers over criminal justice
   We agree that we will approach forthcoming legislation in the area of criminal justice on a case by case basis, with a view to maximising our country’s security, protecting Britain’s civil liberties and preserving the integrity of our criminal justice system. Britain will not participate in the establishment of any European Public Prosecutor.

Whereas previously they were merely aspirations that could remain in the long-grass forever, the opportunity has finally arrived for them to become bargaining points. What is truly interesting is whether the specific ambitions above such as the Working Time Directive can be achieved without regaining our opt-out of the Social Chapter, and whether desired reform to our criminal justice system represents an opportunity to exit European Convention on Human Rights……..?

Does this opportunity really exist and do we really wield sufficient leverage to repatriate these competences? A valid question given the eurozone summit on the 21^st of July that purports to salve all wounds and bring compromise to opposed views.

The answer is yes, for in true euro-politics style the result was smoke and mirrors with many of the fundamental problems masked by soaring rhetoric. To quote Jacques Cailloux and his team at RBS (hat-tip FT Alphaville):

1. Greece Bail Out II now detailed, rolling crisis still likely: The Euro Summit was first and foremost a summit aiming at concluding the negotiations surrounding Greece Bail Out II. This is now done. The political will of some countries to get PSI at any cost won the day which will have a number of negative side effects (rating downgrade for Greece and potentially other countries, ECB requirement for additional guarantees for Greek collateral, market perception that PSI might be a template for other countries) while not bringing substantial economic benefits. Indeed, after almost 3 months of negotiations and effort, the Greek debt load will be at best reduced by 10 to 20 percentage points of GDP to what will still be seen as an unsustainably high level. Overall, this will have been an expensive political decision. In the end, Greece will likely continue facing a rolling crisis around IMF quarterly reviews. Doubts about the trajectory of the economy and the ability to raise privatisation receipts anywhere near the targets will persist.

2. Toolkit to respond to euro area contagion rushed out: The statement clearly gives the impression that euro area policy makers are increasingly ‘getting the message’, with 3 new tools being created: a precautionary programme, a lending facility for non programme countries to recapitalise banks and a bond buying programme in the secondary market. However, the level of detail provided is low, making it hard at this stage to really tell how the new tools will work in practice and how efficient they will end up being. In particular, there is insufficient information available to tell how preventive those tools will end up being deployed and this is related to the lack of clarity surrounding the so called “appropriate conditionality” that will be imposed on member countries accessing these new help mechanisms.

3. Nice tools but no firing power: In our view a key limitation of the announcement is that it did not address the size of the EFSF. We have recently argued that a prerequisite to increase the flexibility of the EFSF was to increase very significantly its size with a view of ultimately having a lending capacity of around Eur2trn. Indeed, under the amended EFSF which will aim at having a lending capacity of Eur440bn, and given current and likely commitments, the EFSF will be left with a little more than Eur300bn of lending and or buying capacity – a too small amount to restore investor’s confidence that the euro area has once and for all dealt with its sovereign crisis. The crisis will in our view linger with markets likely to test the EFSF firepower.

Will the Lib-Dem’s let the coalition partners extract concessions from europe for merely doing the right thing?

Will the Tories really wish to push the coalition partners so inconsiderately for the return of some small powers?

On the former, provided it is within the coalition agreement then they cannot really complain for they are shackled to the wheel of political rehabilitation, determined to prove by 2015 that they are once more a responsible party of government. If broad exemptions from social, employment and criminal justice legislation are necessary to enact the small measures listed in the fine print, then regardless of their distaste they at least have a fig-leaf to hide behind. Is the social-chapter incompatible with a non-compliant Working Time Directive? Is the area of freedom, security and justice incompatible with our proposed sentencing policy?

On the latter point; a bit of judicious Euroscepticism would play well across the political spectrum, appealing to Labour voters and Tory alike, and provided it stays broadly with the generous headings of the coalition agreement they can be fairly sure their partners in government will have to swallow it as long as they are wallowing in the polls.

Do either of these conflict with the stated desire we should not be excluded (or exclude ourselves) from key decisions on issues, such as the single market and financial service regulation? It would appear not.

Where does Germany enter this equation?

The EU is neither representative nor accountable, owing to the fact that there is no common demos, so the german people have no common bond, or familial sentiment, with which to accommodate themselves to a transfer union wherein vast sums of taxpayer moneys are used to subsidise their neighbours indefinately. This is not an abstract concept to the German electorate who have spent 187 Billion euros on the reunification tax for the former East Germany.

The proposed measures to rescue the eurozone will not be detailed before September, and the next German federal election is going to be held within two years of that, so if it takes twelve months to ratify all these measures in the Bundestag, as the Karlsruhr will likely demand they must, then German politicians will be entering a general election have just signed their own death warrant.

If that happens, then everyone will be far too busy attempting to avert financial Armageddon to take time debating exemptions for us fractious Brits!

In summary, the very nature of the crisis is certain to create a two-speed europe, it is merely a matter of whether this momentum can be used to regain that which is essential for the operation of a sovereign nation state, albeit a 21st century version. Being without the Schengen area and the Eurozone, and having boxed security and defence into intergovernmental avenues, with the potential for social, judicial and economic freedom, the potential for an independent Britain certainly exists.

Spare a thought for the transnational progressive, for whom the idea of an al-a-carte europe is an anathema, for their dreams are dust. Where Britain leads countries on the periphery with follow, for ever-deeper-union relied on a sense of inevitability and that spell is now broken.

Update – 2011.08.09 – John Redwood pops up with a jolly good idea:

“what is required would be for this country to surrender its right to veto what the other EU states want to do – whatever it may be and however much power it may take from member states – in return for the right to opt out of anything they do which does not suit us. We could retain our place at the table for new measures, and make our contribution to the debate. If we reached agreement, we would apply it as well; if we could not go along with the majority, we would simply apply our opt-out. The potential opt-out should also apply to any power already given away, so we can restore proper democratic control over what has previously been lost.”

Having grown bored with pointing out the same facts to the emotionally incontinent, over and over again, here is a FAQ:

Usually the cries of doom are vaguely referenced to some statement or press release from Nokia, or more specifically the ‘evil’ one himself. Usually this evidence doesn’t actually say what people think it says, and it certainly never justifies the apocalypse they think it does. The examples that follow are not necessarily the people described above, they just neatly encapsulate a few of the false assumptions going around.

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“Hate to be bringer of bad news, but as the title says, Elop says in interview on todays “Helsingin Sanomat” that N9 will be the last Meego phone even if its successful.”

If you read what the article actually says:

“In Elop’s words, there is no returning to MeeGo, even if the N9 turns out to be a hit.”

He is talking about platforms, not handsets. Yes, Nokia’s platform decision is made; WP7 will be the platform that Nokia invests in to attempt to become the third major mobile ecosystem. Regardless of how well the N9 is received this won’t change that decision, nor should it, but what it will affect is the frequency with which further Linux/QT devices are released.

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“The craziest thing though is that MeeGo itself isn’t important! The things that supposedly make MeeGo the best thing since sliced bread  are the same things that make the UI, UX, Applications and designs and performance platform-INDEPENDENT.“

Oops! Another one referenced against that Elop interview in the Finnish paper.

So is Meego in fact irrelevant, or at least unimportant in the grand scheme of things? Yes and no. QT and the Swipe UI are indeed independent of Meego, and could indeed be applied to any mobile platform, but the important thing is that you do in fact need a platform from which to use these innovations. So why not S40, (accepting that Symbian is dead)? Well cross-platform is nice but the bulk of the revenue and visibility comes from smartphones, as they provide the halo effect by which the criteria of success and failure are weighed in public consciousness. Equally, Nokia is serious about future ‘disruptions’ by which it means keeping its hand in the smartphone development  arena. S40 is never going to be a high-margin smartphone OS, and the idea that Nokia would throw away its investment in the linux kernel is patently ridiculous.

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“Elop is committed to WP as their sole smartphone OS, but this does not exclude the release of other “disruptive” platforms.”

And evidenced against the patent license agreement:

Original Slashgear Article I linked to about Nokia-Apple licensing deal. the Nokia statement from the press release is at the bottom. talks about their plan to make wp their sole mobile smartphone OS and then offers up a truckload of caveats…

But if you read the statement it doesn’t say anything of the sort:

“the expected plans and benefits of our strategic partnership with Microsoft to combine complementary assets and expertise to form a global mobile ecosystem and to adopt Windows Phone as our primary smartphone platform“

“the expected timing of the planned transition to Windows Phone as our primary smartphone platform and the introduction of mobile products based on that platform“

Primary, not sole.

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“MeeGo and Symbian will have to go (although not entirely sure about Symbian). A new smartphone platform will emerge with the N9 UI (Qt). It will be low to mid end and a few more geeky devices.”

In response to the ‘leaked’ video of the first Nokia WP7 phone where Elop talks about which elements of the N9 will live on, notably QT, the UI, and the Industrial design, but no mention of Meego itself.

We do all recall that the switch from Meego to WP7 was a controversial decision, right? A decision that led to much wailing and gnashing of teeth, so is it any surprise that no mention is made of Meego with reference to the future at the staged launch of the companies first WP7 handset?

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“don’t come with that “meego supports only 3 platforms till 2014″ ********. 3 platforms in 3 years is actually more than enough. From a technical point of view there is nothing wrong with meego.”

On the subject of whether Elop might not actually be part of a grand conspiracy to bring down mobile linux.

The fact that Harmattan remains trapped on the ageing Omap3 SoC should tell us plenty about the truth behind elops discovery that Meego was not moving fast enough. These various ARM SoC’s are not generic, they have different capabilities that need to be addressed, particularly mobile settings where the demands of power conservation and multimedia pull in opposite directions.

Windows8 is going to have four different ARM SKU’s, so it is obviously not a trivial matter to have platform development keep pace with hardware evolution, and at least with WP7 Microsoft is paying for that platform adaptation.

The Nokia management and executive aim to make Nokia the third major ecosystem alongside IOS and Android, for failure to do so will see the company marginalised into either a niche platform provider or just another hardware OEM. If they thought Meego could provide this, in sufficient time, then they would have gone with it. They did not, and rather than give up they hunted around for another platform that could allow them to grow fast enough to become the third great mobile ecosystem. They picked WP7.

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None of this means that Meego is useless or pointless, it has excellent potential to hoover up niche users who aren’t persuaded by re-skinned WP7 offerings. It also provides Nokia an insurance policy against a future where a platform they don’t control either can’t or won’t provide the upgrades Nokia feels it needs to stay relevant.

If Samsung can develop Bada and market it alongside their Android products, why can Nokia not develop Linux/QT and market it alongside WP7 products? This question is especially pertinent when you consider that QT and swipe are complimentary technologies to Nokia platforms other than Linux or Symbian; namely S40.

Update – 27th June – Cryptic post from Quim Gill of Nokia/Harmattan fame:

Another approach would be to simply define MeeGo = Kernel mainline + Qt + WebKit, syncing app developers around the OpenGL, Qt and Web APIs – but this is not the reality today

However, look back at the four essential pieces above and keep in mind that Nokia is investing in all of them. Even if working on them is really fun, you may guess that Nokia is not paying the teams for the fun of it. It is sensible to expect more to come in a form or another.

Update – 29th June – Meego not a dead-end:

Mark Squires, PR manager for Nokia, explained: that the N9 “is the only Meego device this year.” In other words, Squires wouldn’t flat-out say that this would be the only Meego device, ever. Does that mean there could be more beyond 2011? I suspect we’ll have to see how this one sells first.

In short, it threatens to make official development assistance comprehensible, succinct, and verifiable.

That is not a good thing, surely, in the eyes of the MoD blackhats. It is a frequently observed fact that many developed nations use their Aid budget to directly buy foreign influence, or to subsidise their military spending, so the ‘chaotic’ independence of the DfID is an impression the MoD will be keen to preserve.

Liam Fox talks of flexible commitments in response to changing priorities, and avoiding the threat of constant legal challenge as similarly posed by the new military covenant, but perhaps what he is really worried about is HMG’s continued ability to shape the world in its image, behind the scenes as well as in centre-stage:

Furthermore, as a result of the wider drive to improve the transparency and accountability of international development work, the Government’s own monitoring and reporting requirements for ODA are likely to become more stringent.

This may present risks to my department’s ability to both report certain priority activities as ODA and, therefore, to receive funding for them from the Conflict Pool.

How does this fit with Herring’s description of Fifth Gradient Warfare as; “the principle of the manipulation of the context of the observations of actors in conflict or confrontation in order to affect a specific positional change or achieve a specific effect.”

Or, indeed the the mechanics of 5GW as described by Rees; “The major features of the power used to wage war are energy and visibility. The smaller the amount of energy that’s concentrated into a form of strategic power, the visible a form of strategic power it is. Any visibility caused by energy expenditure is death to its political desires.”

The words or Pampinella are also instructive; “Constructivist theorists such as Wendt place culture at the centre of analysis, and argue that self-interest  is externally derived through ones social experiences, memories, and definition of ones identity. As social  relations change and actors are exposed to new norms and values, we can expect an actor’s identity to change as well. This involves presenting potential adversaries with new observations that falsify hostile orientations and socialize those actors into developing more cooperative orientations.”

To conclude with Abbot; “A 5th Generation Warfare might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or, even, a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there ever was a war.”

The thinly veiled parallel to which Fox alluded in his complaint is that in creating a legal definition of what aid is and should be, enshrined in law, will thus prevent exactly the kind of harmonisation between aid and security that we seek to achieve.

The aid budget is an tool of enormous significance for practising fifth gradient warfare, provided HMG has the flexibility to apply where it needed and without any obvious indicators to the ‘special’ nature of a given program.

Creating a new rule-set that stipulates in detail the preconditions of development aid, or otherwise, will be problematic.

To provide the hypothetical example of a possible desire to free Lebanon of ‘malign’ external influence:

Requiring select-committee scrutiny of an economic development program in southern Turkey aimed at power generation on the Euphrates may be viewed as suspicious by Syria given the potential for increased unrest among the agriculture dependent in its north.

Especially so if there is a similar scrutiny required for a democracy-awareness program in Kurdish parts of Northern Iraq, given the potential for political awareness to percolate through culturally homogeneous groups regardless of borders.

Would it not be hilarious if, at the same time, DfID sponsored third-party aid programs via Oxfam et-al in Syria that promoted best-practice in sustainable agriculture as well as initiatives that promoted (non-specific) cultural awareness in regions of Syria that include the Kurdish population….

These ends can be countered if recognised, thus negating the [real] value of the aid-project in question, and so it is valuable for the true aims to be obfuscated in what is perceived as a cloud of left-wing touchy-feely emotional incontinence that the popular press have come to expect from DfID.

5GW is the ability to capitalise on latent trends, magnify them with regional events, and bring about change beneficial to your interests via second and third order effects whose provenance remain invisible to ones adversaries.

Fifth Gradient Warfare is destined to become as important a tool of British FP as the coercive effect of expeditionary military force, and that is best served by an apparently sprawling, ill-defined, and unaccountable aid budget.

This presumption of ‘virtue’ has prevented the “yes” campaign from communicating with, and persuading, those people for whom the principle of proportionality or ‘vote-power’ simply is not a significant priority.

The same can be said about the argument in favour of grown-up and consensual politics; does the “yes” vote actually understand that their are people who like the benefits that an adversarial electoral system brings?

It is difficult to bring people round to your way of thinking when you are not interested in debating the merits of alternative views because it is apparently mere propaganda mouthed by useful idiots on behalf of scoundrels.

If we can accept that the conservatism is an attitude whose ambition is not to oppose all change but to resist and balance the volatility of current political fads and ideology, then we must likewise accept that there are people of a progressive bent too, and that it is beneficial for society to have a balance of the two.

This blog is wholly in agreement with the old saw that conservatives fight to protect the systems they fought to reject a generation earlier………….. but:

How did the “yes” campaign try to appeal to the small “c” conservatives in Britain?

The answer is they did not, the presumption of virtue, a failing for which their cause will pay.

If the “yes” campaign was truly serious about persuading the country at large about the merits of electoral reform why then was UKIP marginalised from the their campaign?

The electorate is allegedly composed of adults of legally sound mind, so any argument that the referendum was lost because the “no” campaign didn’t play fair is really a confession that people cannot be trusted with representative democracy. Why not be honest about the implications of that confession? Stop pussy-footing around with electoral tinkering and just advocate the benign governance of technocrats, like the EU or perhaps the PRC……..

This blog does not think that AV is significantly worse than FPTP, but the “yes” campaign has failed to demonstrate to the real majority that AV will be any kind of an improvement, or that the affair was worth their time and effort.

Update – 2011.05.08 – How the “no” campaign won:

They won because the worked tirelessly to appeal across the left-right spectrum, a totally integrated and bipartisan effort.

Update – 2011.05.09 – How the “yes” campaign lost:

They lost because their campaign was designed and run by people who think we all read the Guardian Arts supplement.

It also requires a mandate from the people before the party will have the confidence to change.

To talk of liberalism, the belief in the importance of liberty and equal rights, is difficult by dint of the fact that the word has been appropriated by pretty much every other ideology, conflated with the means by which it has often be achieved, divided by the separate realms of social and economic ideologies, and loosely correlated with the philosophies of negative and positive liberty.

Classical Liberalism was not merely economic Liberalism, and nor too was it purely about negative liberty.

Social Liberalism is not always, in effect, an ideology that maximises liberty, and nor too is positive liberty.

If we can accept that the Conservatism is an attitude whose ambition is not to oppose all change but to resist and balance the volatility of current political fads and ideology, we must likewise accept that it has often been abused by those who elevate it to an ideology.

This is what befell the Ottoman Empire; a conservative ideology that prevented the nation from adapting to a changing world, justifying the ossification of tradition, and repeatedly rejecting the radical policy attempted by successive Sultans that would allow it to compete with the advances of its rival empires.

Likewise it must be recognised that Progressivism is supposed to be an attitude too, not an ideology, and that self-interested human venality has often served to abuse progressivism by justifying the loss of liberty on spurious claims to a greater common good.

This is what befell New Labour; a progressive ideology that enabled a massive raft of policies ‘justified’ by their socially liberal aims, without realising that positive liberty is something that is enforced by government, and that considered as whole the result has been a significant attack on individual liberty.

Labour was not unaware that its benign intention to help people achieve their potential was in fact little more than paternal supervision, but rather than change course it engaged in double-speak by using the word “fairness” where it could no longer talk of “equity” or “justice”.

You might well say;“Surely you exaggerate Mr Beeftrix, it’s all very well for you to invent this great divide between intention and result, but where is the evidence!” The answer to that question is easy:

Just Deserts? Attitudes to Fairness, Poverty and Welfare Reform.

The findings are quite clear -

The majority of people think that fairness is mainly a question of people getting what they deserve, rather than being about equal treatment. This is true of voters of all the main parties. 63% of people say that “fairness is about getting what you deserve”, while just 26% say that “fairness is about equality”. In other words, people’s idea of fairness is strongly reciprocal – something for something.

Meritocratic ideas (reward according to effort and ability) are more widely endorsed than either free market conceptions (reward according to what the market will pay) or egalitarian conceptions (equal rewards). 85% backed fairness as meritocracy, while 63% backed the free market conception and only 41% an egalitarian version.

This is a rather damning indictment of those with an ideological bent towards progressivism who believe that a government should aim actively to create the conditions necessary for individuals to be self-sufficient or to achieve self-realization. It is an easy jump to make to realise that their attachment to progressivism has corrupted the resulting socially liberal policy response, social justice has become a conception that they impose rather than offer.

To which your next question might be; “That might be so Mr. Beeftrix, but no man is independent of his fellow men, what makes you think we have this balance so very wrong?” The answer to that question too is easy:

As Isaiah Berlin noted, there must be a dividing line between individual liberty and public authority and that it is a matter for debate, within society, as to where that line should be drawn. However, to draw parallels between what is done in this country and what is done in another is not at all helpful because a peoples conception of what constitutes liberty is the result of its cultural history. An appeal to consensus among the polities of europe does nothing but suppress the best compromise for your polity.

English Common Law with its roots in the concept of Natural Law has led to a presumption of negative liberty; I am free to do anything that which is not specifically proscribed by the law. Rights are defined as being against interference by the sovereign in the liberty of individual on matters of religion, speech, press, assembly, and free markets.

Continental Civil Law with its closer association with Legal Positivism has led to a presumption of positive liberty. It is my right, as codified in the system of laws, to be able to act in this manner. Rights are defined as things you are allowed to do by the sovereign such as freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly. You are enabled to do these things.

Thus can we understand that British popular objection to ID cards is not merely a function of conditioning, as some imagine has already been experienced by our continental neighbours, rather it is a direct result of a particular understanding of where the divide should be between individual liberty and enabling supervision.

In creating a rash of legislation diminishing the rights of individuals, undermining the inviolability of private property as well as the enforcement of contracts, Labour managed to distort the aim of social liberalism and produce a socially authoritarian result.

How many ways can the government legally force entry into your home? They reasons used to be numbered on one hand, now there are I am told hundreds. Some of these will be for perfectly ‘nice’ reasons like protecting vulnerable kids, a large proportion will be for similarly innocuous reasons, but taken together they represent a fantastic assault on the negative liberty that you as a citizen are supposed to possess.

Do the Lib-Dem’s care about this kind of freedom?

So where does this all lead? Can it provide the ideological breathing space for the Liberal Democrats to set out a coherent and distinct message to the electorate about the manner in which they would seek to govern?

This blog believes that there is a now wide gulf between the paternalistic supervision of Labour and neoliberalism of the Conservative party.

The Lib-Dem message should be that while they will retain a progressive attitude to the pursuit of Social Liberalism it will always be referenced against the requirements of personal liberty. Policy wise this means a rejection of Labours client-state whereby the disadvantaged are kept in thrall to a culture of benefits subsistence allied with high taxation. The increase in the personal Income Tax allowance is an excellent example of this. This comes back to the question of what taxation is for:

The aim of the Liberals should not be to create a more equal society by punitively taxing the rich, just for the purpose of making them less rich, that portion of the political spectrum is already occupied by the Labour party in British politics.

The aim of the Liberals must be to create a more equal society by using a progressive taxation system to ensure that public services can be maintained at a level which allows the weakest and most vulnerable in society to prosper and advance their condition.

Likewise to distance themselves from the laissez-faire tendencies of the Conservative party by continuing to advocate a the use of the State to increase the enfranchisement of disadvantaged groups within society, and do so with progressive policy action where the Conservatives would be tempted to leave ‘well-enough’ alone. The pupil premium is a good example of this in recent Lib-Dem policy.

However, as important as distancing themselves ideologically from Labour and the Conservatives is, what they must also do is become a party for the whole nation, which means abandoning policy that results from an ideological fascination with progress (for the sake of progress), for it too easily sees the party written off as unsupportable by those who remain uncommitted. Being seen as a pro-EU party come hell-or-highwater would be an apt example. Of the words “representative democracy” it is the former that is truly important, the latter is only a means to an end.

The opportunity that the Lib-Dem’s have right now is that for the first time in a century they are seen as a serious party of government, enhanced by Labours dogged determination not to repent for their past authoritarianism. They have four more years to continue to cement themselves in the public image as a responsible advocate of progressive and socially liberal politics. Much as the Conservatives have done the same with their re-brand towards compassionate conservatism. Both parties have an interest in making the Big Society work for its success acts to remove Labour from public perception as a responsible party of government.

This opportunity has only a brief window however, for despite having a leader in hock to the unions, and a shadow Chancellor in hock to deficit denial, the Labour party will drag itself back to the centre. If not in this parliament then certainly in the next.

The Just Deserts research provides a mandate upon which the needs of enabling supervision can be balanced against the desire for individual liberty, will the Lib-Dem’s seize it?

Update – 2011.06.20 – Am I wrong insomuch as I conflate Social Liberalism with Social Democracy?

Found a very interesting post titled: What is the difference between a social liberal and a social democrat? In particular the following response from Dr Evan Harris:

“Social liberal” is an unsatisfactory term in some ways because the “orange-bookers” are liberal on social issues (ie social liberals in that sense) in the main.

And many social liberals would consider themselves to be economically liberal in the sense of not being protectionist or anti-capitalist or even anti-market.

The difference between Orange-book-type economic liberal and so called social liberals is perhaps the relative priority we place on social justice (or socio-economic fairness).

I would say that most if not all social democrats (and by that I don’t just mean ex-SDP members) in the Lib Dems are social liberals. But not all social liberal are original social democrats.

The Social Liberal Forum brings social democrats together with traditional Liberals who feel more strongly about the importance of social justice as a means and an end than “neo-classical economic liberals” (or Orange-bookers for short).

So perhaps Orange-book Liberal = Social Liberal minus social democracy.

All these terms are clunky and as you can see it from above I don’t think Social Liberals should define ourselves solely by opposition to, or difference with, “Orange-book Liberals”. But it would would be useful to hear what an Orange-booker feels distinguishes them from a social liberal and whether it is indeed the absence of a strong social democratic aspect.

I maintain that the basic premise is correct; that liberals should steer clear of Labours authoritarian paternalism, but perhaps that is because the party flirted with social democracy rather than an inherent flaw in social liberalism?