Dangerous things, predictions. But what the hell. The first one on the status of EU migrants is looking pretty good after last night, will that success continue…
Made early April, lets come back in two years and see if I’m anywhere near the mark.
1. We’ll make permanent the status of EU migrants in respective countries.
> Something equivalent to an automatic declaration of permanent residency for eu citizens who’ve been in-country for more than five years.
> The automatic right to stay in-country and achieve the five year permanent residency under the old regime if you arrived prior to Art50.
> The qualified right to achieve five year permanent residency under the stricter non-eu regime as per the RoW if you arrived after Art50.
2. The Brexit bill will end up being counted in the single figure billions once debts and assets are divvied up.
> I doubt there will even be a payment for the balance as such, it will simply be massaged into long term transfers and interest payments.
> We’ll not pull out our ‘investment’ in the EIB.
> We’ll pay our dues, because that is what we do. Simply that the dues agreed won’t be as apocalyptic as some imagine.
3. The EU:Ukraine DCFTA will be the template upon which the free-trade agreement is built.
> It is purpose designed for an ‘association’ state, not an accession state. Which is exactly what we’ll be.
> The Services section (chapter 6) will be arbitrated under a joint panel, not the ECJ as is the case with Ukraine.
> There will be fewer exceptions in the negative list of reserved areas than is the case with Ukraine.
4. The UK will remain outside the EEA (eventually, but not necessarily efta), and thus removed from the direct jurisdiction of the ECJ.
> Notwithstanding the enormous quantity of soft law that derives from international regulatory bodies, we’ll want to avoid being a rule-taker.
> That said, I’ve little doubt there will be areas where equivalence is not available, and a limited sector based passport is agreed.
> Further, that there will remain some limited areas of legislation where it is sensible to remain under EU regulation (and thus the ECJ). Fine.
5. That we will remain outside [the] customs union and free to conclude our own trade agreements.
> Having said that specific integrated supply chains will be included in the envelope of [a] customs union.
> We will quickly pickup existing eu trade agreements, because we are willing to provide better terms (fewer protected areas).
> Individual FTA’s with Canada, Oz and Nz may eventually become a CANZUK trade zone.
6. Security cooperation will be maintained, and in fact deepen in some areas.
> We will have a formal agreement for participation in the nordic defense union, as well as the Visegrad group.
> We’ll keep on providing a security guarentee to europe, as well as supplying intelligence, and europe will continue being grateful.
> NATO will weaken, rather than fail, and that will make us more important as a bridge to those for whom defence matters.
It will probably require an EEA transition period beyond Art50 to set in place the passports, equivalence regime, and arbitration.
Broadly, i think this benign view of events will come about due to mutual self-interest:
When 80% of FDI arrives through london, hard-brexit is calamitous stupidity to nations with negative interest rates, 10% unemployment, and weak growth.The next cyclical downturn is coming, u ready yet?
Whatever the UK gets will be ‘inferior’ to EU membership. But that’s fine, because it will mainly involve the EU keeping things we don’t value very much, and the UK gaining things that the EU doesn’t rate very highly. This is after all why we are leaving, because there was a mismatch between the perceived benefits and tradeoffs.
Oh, and security for trade is definitely a thing.
As an aside, I have just ploughed through 400 pages on Flexcit, and I’m struck by a number of themes common to my own musings:
- The desire to see a post EU construct that is wider and shallower than the EU of 28, separating out the market based functions from the political ambition of the eurozone ultra’s.
- The similarity between my notion of something built on the bones of the EU:Ukraine DCFTA, and what Dr North terms the “shadow EEA” option, both compatible with EFTA.
- The need to question how it came to be that our supposedly Sovereign Parliament proved so willing to sell off to a third party the power to govern that we the people had only loaned to it.
More power to his pen!
Update – 22/02/2018 – On the subject of Northern Ireland
Originally stated on the 21st December in answer to the question: What is the solution to Brexit without a border for Northern Ireland?
Read the wording carefully, it references alignment where it supports the all-island-economy and the Good Friday agreement. They aren’t loose words, there are very specific competences and obligations associated with those words. Many of which apply today, such as food/agriculture, such that there is already a border between islands. You can align with those things, without needing to align with the other 80%
Why do I mention it? Oh, i don’t know…
Update – 22/09/2018 – On the subject of Common Rule Books and Customs regimes
Update – 31/10/2018 – Chequers is dead, the common rule book (for goods), may not be.
Update – 05/11/2018 – Is all the argument from britain over the “unless and until” all a stalking horse, for britain to get a sufficiently fleshed out backstop that the EU have been bounced into a regime that has to accept the legitimacy of a “shadow-EEA” regime for goods, a-la Australia? Reading the OE explainer today (02/12/2018), I’m beginning to think it is: “If the UK chose to remain fully aligned with the EU’s regulatory environment, Article7(2) provides a good faith commitment from the EU to ensure checks and controls between Great Britain and Northern Ireland are minimised.”